Reason: the strategic integration between industry and distribution does not seem to be the main problem of a group whose strategy remains difficult to decipher.

For over half a century, mass consumption has lived on an equilibrium that is as simple as it is fragile:industry produces, distribution chooses. When this balance is broken, consumers pay the consequences with worse products and higher prices.

It is no coincidence that one of the most cited texts in the culture of modern distribution,The Gospel according to Marks & Spencer, opens with a well-known warning:"Never was incest more fatal than that between producer and distributor".

The acquisition ofCarrefour ItaliafromNewPrincessuddenly brings this strategic taboo back to the fore. It's not just about the change of ownership of a distribution network. It is something much deeper: a large industrial manufacturer enters directly into distribution, potentially becoming a competitor of its customers and arbiter of the offer on the shelves.

The peculiarity is that this operation is grafted onto one of the most symbolic genealogies of Italian distribution: that ofGS – General Supermarkets, founded by Guido Caprotti and Marco Brunelli, then entered the orbit of Carrefour and today, for the first time, controlled by an industrial group.

A passage that reopens a question that the consumer goods supply chain has always preferred to avoid: what happens when industry and distribution stop being counterparts and become part of the same system?

The acquisition of Carrefour Italia by NewPrinces reopens one of the oldest dilemmas in mass consumption.

A question that some observers ask concerns theincentives for innovation.If an industrial group also controls a distribution network, what will be the incentive to invest in the development of new products, especially when investments are high and existing products guarantee safe sales?

Another point concernsaccess to market information: price lists, promotions, commercial conditions and innovations of competitors could be more easily observable by those who operate simultaneously as a producer and distributor.

This too could generate questions about competitive neutrality.

In the meantime, Carrefour's city network could offer assortments with a significant share of private label (50%). A strategy that can be read as a tool for efficiency and greater control of margins, but which also raises a question: does this composition of the assortment really reflect consumers' preferences or does it rather limit them to the available offer?

Stay thenthe theme ofprices: ideally they should arise from the comparison between the efficiency of different producers. If, however, they were mainly determined by marginalization needs of the supply chain, the risk is that the final consumer ends up less at the center of the system.

It must be said, however, that mass consumption is an extremely fluid system. Purchases tend to move quickly towards those who offer innovation, purchasing experience or competitive prices. No local position, however strong, is sufficient to permanently direct consumer behavior.

A very large portfolio, but what strategy?

Looking at the industrial composition of the NewPrinces group, one thing emergesextremely broad and varied portfolioof brands and categories.

In the perimeter coexist historic pasta brands such as Delverde, Pezzullo and Corticella, infant nutrition brands such as Plasmon, Nipiol, BiAglut, Aproten and Dieterba, and a long series of international grocery brands from the acquisition of Princes, including Napolina, Branston, Mazola, Crisp'n Dry and Ragu.

Alongside these we find the vast dairy galaxy linked to Centrale del Latte d'Italia - Mukki, Polenghi Lombardo, Giglio, Fior di Salento, Torre in Pietra, Matese - as well as various local brands and regional specialities.

The result is a wallet that crossesvery different categories: pasta, preserves, oils, baby food, milk, cheeses and international grocery. A large and complex set of brands, distributed across different markets and positionings.

The question that arises spontaneously is: what is the strategic thread that connects this very heterogeneous set of activities? Is this a size and scale strategy? Or a portfolio of brands destined to be enhanced through distribution?

Many consumer groups have built very recognizable strategies over time. Montenegro, for example, is very strong in specific categories such as bitters, spices and infusions. In the past, Reckitt Coleman had also developed a similar position with indispensable brands in specific categories. In these cases, distribution can hardly do without those products.

It is less clear whether the same principle applies to NewPrinces, which does not appear to be the undisputed leader in key categories.

Moreover, in the private label market, there already exist very specialized operators: global groups such as La Doria or quality producers such as De Matteis for pasta, up to highly price-oriented operators. It is a very structured competitive context.

Possible market reactions.

Another unknown concerns relationships with othersdistribution actors.

It is plausible that some chains may be prudent in entrusting the production of their MDD to a group that also controls a competing supermarket network.

Similarly, branded companies could wonder about sharing commercial conditions and promotional policies with an operator who simultaneously plays the role of producer and distributor.

These are dynamics that the consumer goods market has always managed with great attention.

Strategic design.

Beyond these questions, the main point remains: what it will bethe strategic trajectoryof NewPrinces?

Perhaps the most correct way to look at the issue is precisely this: asking the right questions and remembering how crucial the existence of a truly differentiating strategy is in every industrial sector. It is precisely this element that, at least for now, appears difficult to identify in the case of NewPrinces.

It could be a strategy of internationalization, of building critical mass or of enhancing a portfolio of brands. Or a clearer pattern could emerge over time that is not yet fully visible today.

In many food sectors it is possible to recognisecoherent and distinctive strategies.

Even in wine we can recognize important strategies (Botter, Ferrari/Lunelli, Santamargherita/Ca'del Bosco, Antinori, Frescobaldi, Gaia, etc...). In convenience: Kevin, Findus, Casa Taradellas, Rio Mare, to name a few. In the premium: Mutti, Nonno Nanni, the Rosa dell'Angelo. In gluten free: Dr. Schär. In the confectionery sector, Loaker, Lindt, Novi, Balocco, coherent and determined companies. Convenience can be found in the premium Nespresso as well as in the high quality mainstream Bourbon coffee.

It is possible that the group's next moves will clarify the direction taken.

If this were the case, many of the current perplexities could prove to be just a step in a broader strategy.

In the meantime, the integration between industry and distribution seems to take a back seat to the more interesting question: what industrial design will emerge from this sequence of acquisitions?